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COLLECTION AND COMPROMISE OF PENALTIES
UNDER THE INCOME TAX LAW
Probably the most manifest phenomenon today resulting
from the break-down of the American legal system for the pre-
vention of crime is that tendency of the legislative branches of
the government to place into the hands of an administrative,
rather than a judicial officer the summary and arbitrary power
for the collection of penalties and the enforcement of forfeitures.
One may understand the scepticism of the layman or more pro-
gressive lawyers upon the results of any reform of judicial pro-
cedure in criminal law when one reflects upon the treatment
which the code reform of common law pleading received a few
generations ago at the hands of those men who interpreted the
law. The purpose of penalties and forfeitures is preventative
and punitive in the same character as any criminal action. An
individual should be given the same constitutional safe guards in
such cases as in a criminal action. 1 It may prove interesting to
examine a recent case upon this question.
Walker v. The Alamo Food Company was decided in 1927 by
the Federal Circuit Court of the Fifth District.2 The facts deserve
special notice. In 1918 two criminal indictments were returned
by the federal grand jury charging the officers of the plaintiff
corporation with making false and fraudulent tax returns. In
1919 the commissioner of internal revenue made an assess-
ment against the plaintiff for $370,000 for income taxes and pen-
alties for the years of 1916 and 1917, giving ten days notice
to pay the amount or a distress warrant would issue against
the property of the plaintiff and a sale be made by the revenue
officer without any court action. Plaintiff applied to the collector
for time and was granted such extension only upon the condition
that all its property be conveyed to a trustee to await the de-
termination of the request of abatement. Plaintiff, after the
refusal to abate the assessment, took advantage of the provision
of the federal statute and submitted "a proposal of compromise"
to the collector.3 The proposal included a fifty per cent reduction
1 Chancellor Kent said that an administrative officer should not be
given the power to enforce penalties and forfeitures for the person is de-
prived of a trial by jury in a case that is "highly penal". 1 Kent's Com.
(13ed) 372, 376.
Also see Mr. Justice Field's remarks in U. S. v. Chauteau (1880), 102
U. S. 603.
216 Fed. (2) 694.
3 U. S. C. 26-158; R. S. 3229 (Comp. Stat. 5952).
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of the penalty and full payment of the tax. The common prac-
tice in such cases is that the "proposal" must come from the tax-
payer, but the terms, which would be "acceptable" are actually
suggested or hinted by the collector.4 This fact is extremely
important in determining the character of the transaction,
whether it is in reality a demand and coerced payment or an
offer and a free and voluntary payment by the party, The pro-
posal included the dropping of all criminal prosecutions under
the revenue laws against the officers of the plaintiff.
This compromise was accepted and plaintiff paid the money
and then brought suit for the sum alleging that it was exacted
illegally and under protest and coercion. The court held that
neither the tax nor the penalty could be recovered giving as its
reason that the payment was voluntary and a compromise.
There ate a number of points raised by this case. The Supreme
Court has not passed upon a case of this kind although it has in
numerous cases announced principles which if applied to this
case would reverse the lower court.5 Let us take the points up
separately.
1. A distinction should be noted between the payment of the
tax which was in full and the penalty which was compromised
by the revenue officer. This is of the highest importance.6 A
4 The writer has found this to be the common practice. Hence the
proposal really comes from the government.
5 But see the anomalous and well known case of Oceanic Navigation Co.
v. Stranahan (1909), 214 U. S. 320, 29 S. Ct. 671.
6 There is an immense practical importance in this distinction as will
readily be seen upon reflection of the method of collection of taxes and the
enforcement proceedings. The designation of the amount to be paid as a
"tax" is not conclusive. (See Dukich v. Blair (1925) 3 Fed. (2) 302), nor is
it if designated a "penalty", if the money is really for revenue. See State
ex rel. Auban School District v. Boyd, 63 Neb. 829, 89 N. W. 417. If the
collection is for the purpose of compensating for an injury to a private indi-
vidual it is debt. See State v. Public Service Commission (1917) 94 Wash.
274, 162 Pac. 523. But if the purpose is to prevent and punish for an act
which is in statutory declaration stated to be illegal, it is penal. Espe-
cially is this so if the sum is recoverable by the government. Dukrich V.
Blair, 3 Fed. (2) 302.
This question arises quite often in cases of violation of Federal liquor
laws, under which congress placed a "tax" upon illegally manufactured
liquor. The point was urged before the Supreme Court that this was in
reality a penalty, but the court held quite logically that if the amount pay-
able is the same as that against legally manufactured spirits it is a tax, for
a criminal should not be relieved of the burdens of supporting the govern-
ment which are assumed by those acting legally. See U. S. v. One Ford-
Coupe, 47 S. Ct. 154 (1926). But if the amount levied is greater than that
against legally manufactured spirits, it is a penalty. Lipke v. Lederer, 259'
U. S. 557, 42 S. Ct. 549, 66 L. Ed. 1061.
COMMENTS
penalty is a punishment. Has an administrative officer the ar-
bitrary power to decide the amount of the punishment and when
it shall be visited upon a violator of the law? This statement
needs no authority to deny it. Constitutional provisions say
that a person shall not be deprived of his property without due
process. Today only the Federal Government and the State of
New York use the summary distress warrant for the collection
of revenue. 7 The theory originated in the idea that the govern-
ment should be saved from any financial embarrassment in the
collection of its revenue by the quick remedy of putting a per-
son's property up for sale without any court action. Certainly
there is no need for the collection of penalties in the same sum-
mary manner. The government should wait until a court has
tried the person for his crime and not leave it to the discretion
of an administrative officer to decide whether there has been a
violation or not and the amount of penalty. But the tenderness
of the courts for the financial feelings of the government has
gone so far as to relieve it of any of its obligations when it does
not care to be sued.8
The state courts seem to be unanimous in not permitting the
enforcement or collection of any penalties by an administrative
officer, even when the proceedings are quasi-judicial and notice
and hearing is given, which if it were not for the penal nature
of the proceedings would be quite legal.9
2. If an administrative officer has no power to collect a pen-
alty should an officer have the power to compromise or forgive
7 See Cooley on Taxation, p. 438; McMurray v. Hoboken (1855), 18 How.
272; Ross v. Holtzman (1828) Fed. Case No. 12,075 (3 Cranch C. C. 391).
8The leading cases are: Langford v. U. S. (1879), 101 U. S. 341, 25 L.
Ed. 1010; Levy v. Mayor (1848), 1 Sandf. (N. Y.) 465. The propriety
of the rule that a state is not liable for its torts may be doubted in recent
times, since a government is operated for the good of the people and the
people should sustain by taxation any injury or unusual hardships in-
flicted in the functioning of the government for the common good.
9 The revocation of a license is ordinarily not penal in character, but if
the statute provides that upon violation of the law the individual shall be
fined and in the same provision of the criminal code, states that his licenses
shall also be revoked, the courts have said that this is part of the punish-
ment and an administrative body cannot revoke the license but the court
must so act if it sees fit and make it part of the punishment. Wichifta
Electric Co., v. Hinckley (1910), - Texas Civ. App. 131 S. W. 1192.
But if the regular licensing act provides among other causes for revoca-
tion that of a violation of the law, an administrative body may act after
conviction or before, if on notice and hearing, and revoke the license. See
Spiegler v. City of Chicago (1905), 216 Ill. 114, 74 N. E. 718, Higgins v.
Talty (1900), 156 Mo. 280. Removal from office ordinarily is not penal in
character.
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a penalty? Punishment is strictly a judicial function and an
individual should have his constitutional privileges guaranteed.
Logically if an administrative officer cannot exercise the affirma-
tive power he should not be given the negative. An administra-
tive tribunal may not be granted the power to pardon except by
a constitutional provision.10 In compromising penalties there is
as wide a field for abuse as in enforcing them without judicial
process, considering the inconvenience to which an innocent in-
dividual may be placed by the whim of some over-zealous officer.
3. The court in the instant case found that there was no pro-
test or coercion in the payment of the money, with the threat of
the sale of the property in ten days and two indictments held
over the corporate officers' heads. One wonders what would be
coercion in such a case. The court does not tell us. It may be
assumed without argument that one never endures punishment
without protest. Then may one be expected to pay a penalty
without coercion or protest? No such assumption need exist in
the case of a tax, for it is not a penalty or punishment.1 1
The question then arises whether a compromise may be paid
under protest and coercion; or must one pay the full amount de-
manded in order to argue that the amount was exacted under
coercion? It seems this should not be necessary. One would
naturally seek to pay as small an amount as necessary particu-
larly if he thought that the penalty was illegal or not applicable
to him. The fact that he pays a compromised or smaller amount
is not evidence of no coercion or protest.12 In natural justice
he should have the right to recover any sum paid the govern-
ment by mistake or illegally although not under protest at the
time. Yet this is not the law in the case of taxes.13 Certainly
the government should be as lenient to an individual who pays a
10 A very interesting case on this point is Allen v. Board of State Audi-
tors (1899), 122 Mich. 324, 81 N. W. 113.
11 "The parties were not on equal terms. The appellant had no choice.
The only alternative was to submit to an illegal exaction or discontinue
business. It was in the power of the officer of the law and could only do
as he required. Money paid or other value parted with under pressure has
never been regarded as a voluntary act within the meaning of the maxim
volenti non fit injuria" Swift Co. v. U. S. (1884), 111 U. S. 22, 4 S. Ct. 244.
12 The writer intentionally employed the double negative here because
an affirmative statement would not convey the correct meaning.
13 Authorities in .point are too numerous to mention. Shaw C. J. says:
"When therefore a party not liable to a taxation is called upon peremptorily
to pay upon such a warrant and he can save himself and his property in no
other way than by paying the illegal demand, he may give notice that he so
pays it by duress and not voluntarily, and by showing that he is not liable
recover it back for money had and received." Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick. 14.
COMMENTS
sum willingly as he who is protesting and finally establishes his
right. At least the propriety of such a rule is doubtful and
should not be extended to penal cases where there was in reality
a protest and coercion but a smaller amount was paid by compro-
mise.
4. No case cited in the opinion involved a compromise of a
penalty by an administrative officer. The cases cited were either
contracts with the government which were compromised 14 or
cases of taxation. 15 Only one was of a penal nature, and it was
not compromised by an administrative officer but was paid in full
before demanded and voluntarily at the time the delinquent tax
was paid.
5. The compromise agreement had the added feature of the
dropping of criminal prosecutions. This savors very much of
the purchasing of justice through an administrative officer.
A federal statute authorizes this dubious action along with the
uncertain "pardoning power" by compromising penalties.' 6 If a
person is guilty he deserves the full penalty as decided by a court
of criminal jurisdiction. If he is not guilty he should not be
punished especially at the whim of an officer who wields an arbi-
trary power in his hands, which he may exercise or compromise
at his discretion. One may well imagine a case in which an
innocent individual might feel the economy of paying what is
hinted would be "acceptable" in a "proposal of compromise"
in order to keep his business and property free and in operation
or to forego the possibility of an indictment being returned
against him or an action for taxes and penalties the outcome of
which would be uncertain. In such a case he should have the
same remedy as one who paid the full amount and recover all
which was illegally taken. The rule against the recovery of
money paid voluntarily need not be extended to an absurdity
especially in view of the doubtful advisibility within the sphere
in which it is now working.
If an administrative officer may not enforce a penalty, logic-
ally he should not have the power to forgive or compromise a
14 Swift Co. v. U. S. (1884), 11 U. S. 22, 14 S. Ct. 244; Savage Executric
v. U. S., 92 U. S. 382, 23 L. Ed. 66; Little v. Bowers (1890), 134 U. S. 547,
10 S. Ct. 620; Ostrum, v. City, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 462, 71 S. W. 304; Lee v.
Inhabitants (1859), 79 Mass. 476, 13 Gray 476; Ward v. Love, 253 U. S.
17, 40 S. Ct. 419; Gear Scott and Co. v. Shannon, 223 U. S. 468, 32 S. Ct.
236; U. S. v. New York and Cuba S. S. Co., 200 U. S. 488, 26 S. Ct. 327;
Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 98 U. S. 541, 25 L. Ed. 196.
15 Palomares Land Co. v. Los Angeles County (1905) 146 Calf. 530, 80
Pac. 3.
16See U. S. C. (1926), 26-158; R. S. 3229 (Comp. Stat. 5952).
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penalty. Particularly is this so when terms of the compromise
includes the abatement of other criminal prosecutions against
the individual. The federal courts, however, do not seem to have
given much consideration to the constitutional question arising
in inflicting and compromising of penalties outside the courts.
The few cases that have been brought to the attention of the
courts upon the question of compromises have been by parties
wishing to take advantage of the statutory terms and the duty
was placed upon the government officials to urge the unconstitu-
tionality of such provisions, who would not be very prone to do
so. The cases have dealt mainly with the interpretations of the
statutes as a result. In Dorsheimer v. United States (1866) a
revenue collector objected to a compromise agreement because it
reduced the amount to be received by him as a reward for dis-
covering the illegal act of the taxpayer.17 The compromise was
held valid. In United States v. Chouteau (1880) there was an
action on a bond for a penalty, and a compromise agreement was
pleaded.' 8 It was held a good defense.
Federal administrative officers have an unusual latitude in the
exercise of arbitrary and summary powers, it will be seen upon
investigation or contact -with them in matters of immigration,
revenues, and prohibition laws. They are in a class by them-
selves. Just why the federal courts should see fit to deviate from
the established principals regarding judicial trials, particularly
in penal cases, while all the states are quite conservative in per-
mitting any officer to exercise such summary powers is worth
considering. One wonders if bureaucracy tends towards these
principles. There seems to be less reason for federal officers
exercising such powers than for state officers since ones reme-
dies in federal cases are not as complete and convenient. 19
NORMAN F. ARTERBURN.
At the Vincennes Bar.
17 7 Wall. 166; 74 U. S. 166.
18 102 U. S. 603; In Rau v. U. S. (1919), 260 Fed. 131, the same question
arose and a compromise agreement was held to be a good defense to an
action brought for violation of the act for which the penalty was paid.
19 Many extraordinary remedies against federal officers can be sought
only through courts of the United States and in some cases only in the
District of Columbia, since the court in that district alone, of all federal
courts, has the common law jurisdiction of the King's Bench, necessary for
the writ of mandamus. Kendall v. U. S. ex reL Stokes (1838), 12 Pet. 524,
9 L. Ed. 1181; See also Bath County v. Amy (1871), 13 Wall 244, 20 L.
Ed. 539.
